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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY 




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 





NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a review of proceedings before the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah culminating in an order by 
the Commission that Plaintiff pay benefits as provided 
li>· the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act by reason 
of fatal injury sustained by Phillip H. Russon on .Jan-
uar>· 19, 1966, in the course of his employment with A-1 
Qnalit,v Glass Co., herein called A-1. 
1 
STATE:MEX'l1 OF FACTR 
There is no question as to the employment status of 
the deceased ( i. e. he was an emplo~'ee of A-1) or as to 
his having been in the course of his employment ·when 
fatally injured 011 .Jmmary 1!1, 1966. The on1~, isslw re-
lates to coverage, it being Plai11tiff 's e011te11tio11 that 
the compensation policy on which Plaintiff's responsi-
hilit~r must he predicated was validly eance11ed for statu-
tory reasons and in statutol'y manner hefon' the aeei<lP11t. 
Sometime prior to October 19, 1965, A-1 l'equestc<1 
Plaintiff to recalculate the premium ($422.0;3) \\-hich had 
been hilled for the policy year beginning Septemlwr 2G, 
1965 (R-30, 84). On October 19, 1965, Plaintiff sent 
~i-1 an amended billing (R-82) which shows a $161.15 
premium reduction base<l on employee reclassification and 
1111 "mnonnt dne" of $260.90 ( i. e. the $422.05 origi-
llall~' hilled less the $161.15 Cl'eclit for reclassificatio11 
reduction). 
On December 3, 1965, Plaintiff, having by the11 re-
ceived no part of the pl'eminm even as rNlucP<l, mailed 
notices of caneellation (R-91) to A-1 and th0 Commis-
sion's Compensation Division. 'fl1ere is some question, 
since the Commission's stamping is defective (R-72) 
about when the Commission's copy was received, but it 
was certainly received by December 15, 1965 (R-78). 
1,here is no question about when A-1 received its notice>. 
:\[rs. Horton of A-1 signed a r0ceipt on Decemlwr 7, 
1965 (R-55) and dispatched a check in the amom1t of 
$161.15 ($99.75 less than the premium due) on December 
8, 1966 ( R-87). 
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On December 30, 1965 (15 clays before the end 
of the statutor.'T :30-cla)T period which must expin• 
after notice of cancellation before the cancellation can 
hC' effective) Plaintiff sent A-1 a statement of account 
showing the amount which remained to be paid in ordt-r 
tn rei11state the polic~v (R-88). Previously (R-56) Mr. 
Larson had telephoned Mrs. Horton and advisefl her that 
the payment of December 8, 1965 was defirient, and an 
additional $99.75 would have to be sent to ''reinstate 
the policy." By .January 14, 1966 ("when 30 clays after 
the effective date of the notice of cancellation, as stated 
on its fare, had elapsed), no additional payment had 
lwc•11 made. A-1 cli<l send Plaintiff a rheck for $99.7:i 
aftn the fatal accident of January 19, 1966. The rheek 
was clatNl .January 30 and received by Plaintiff, as in-
dicated by the time stamp on the back, on February 21. 
rrhe $161.15 payment was neYer returned to A-1 because 
:Tear-encl audit revealed that A-1 was more than $161.1:5 
in arrears on its 1964-65 premium (R-93). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order of this Court annn1ling the 
award herein as against Plaintiff and declaring the Com-
mission's finding that A-1 had compensation co\Teragc 
with Plaintiff on January 19, 1967, to be against the law 
and the evidence. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF MORE THAN CO~IPLIED \YITR 
THE LETTER OF THE LAW IN EFFECT-
ING THE CANCELLATION OF THE POLICY 
HEREIN. THERE ARE NO EQUITABLE 
PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD APPLY TO 
VITIATE THE CANCELLATION. 
It should be noted at the outset that there is no qne8-
tion about Wendy Russon 's being entitled to receive the 
benefits our compensation act provides for surviving de-
pendents. The only issue is whether those benefits should 
be paid by A-1 or Plaintiff. The principle that the com-
pensation act should be liberally construed for workmen 
has no application to the contest between these corpo-
rations. 
The compensation act imposes direct responsibility 
on employers, not on insurance carriers. Section 35-1-46 
UCA requires every employer to secure ('Ompensation 
to its employees "by insuring and keeping insured." 
The statutes do give an employer ample protection 
against the possibility that its coverage will expire with-
out its knowledge. Section 31-19-14 permits canc<>lla-
tion only for nonpayment of premium and then only llJJOll 
30 days written notice by the carrier to the employer aml 
the Commission. 
The statutes (31-19-14) require every authorized 
compensation carrier to accept every application for 
compensation coverage made to it. They do not, how-
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eyer, require that the other customers of an authorized 
carrier must assume the ohlig-ations of an emp]o>rrr who 
mnkrs application an<l refuses to pay premiums. Thr 
hnsic concept of insnrancr is that all of the insured as-
snme the risk of each of the insured hy contrihuting to 
a common fnn<l. Thr onC' who fails to contrihute must 
lose his protection. Carriers are therefore given by 
statute a means of cancelling the polic>r of an insured who 
"·i11 not pay premiums. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff more than complied 
with the letter and spirit of the act. It orig-ina1ly hillr<l 
for 1965-66 premiums on Sept. 25, 1965. When ques-
tion -vrns raised as to the amount of the premium, plain-
tiff reYiewe<l the work history of A-1 's employees, rr-
f']assified them and hilled again, at the reduced ratr, on 
October 19, 1965. A-1 faile<l to pay even the reduced 
premium hy Decemher 3, 1965, so Plaintiff resorted to 
tlw statutory procedure for extricating itself and con-
sprnng its reserves for those who had contributed to 
them. 
Plaintiff did more than give 30 <fa>rs noticr of can-
ce]hition. On Decemher 3, it mailed a notice which had 
an eff ectivre <late of December 15, and thus commenced 
on Decemher 15 the 30-day perio<l during which the 
premium had to he paid to reinstate the policy. A-1 still 
f ailerl to pay the premium: it paid only about 60% of 
the nmount due. Before Christmas, Mr. Larson advised 
A-1 h>- telephone that the remainder must be paid (R-56). 
011 D0cemher ~O, Plaintiff sent A-1 a final premium stat<:'-
mPnt clearly expressing the premium deficienr>r (R-88). 
..:\-1 failed to 1·es11orn1. .Tamrn1·v l-1- (t]1(' 1hirtif'tli <LIY . . 
after the• effect iv<> <late of the notie<>) earn<> and ·went. The 
<·a11c·pflatirm 1.i:as statutorily Pjf P('f Prl. 
Then• is no prineiple of 0qnit)' ·whi(·h should appl~· 
to excuse an employer from failur<> to satisf)· its statu-
tory ohligation nnder the circnmstanc<>s of this ras<>. 
"fore than statutory notice was gin.•n. Telepho1w enm. 
munication heyoml statutory demand ·was initiatPd h~· 
Plaintiff so that A-1 would he fully appriserl of tlw c·o11-
sequenccs of its continuing failnr<>. To impose rdilig;i. 
tion on the insurance carrier under these cirrnmstarwc" 
indicates a misapprehension as to the sonrre of insuranf'r 
company funds. 
POINT II 
PART PA Y'.\fEXT OF PRE'.\TIF-:\f DOES XOT 
REINSTATE AX IXSrRAXCE POLICY. 
We would emphasize at the outset that most of th1• 
easPs li0n•in rite<l i11volYe life insuranc<> polic:· forf0itnrc« 
n11<l01· eirrnmstances ,,·here> the law n•C'og-niz<><;; tl1<' i11;;;111·pi] 
to he under a clisach·antage. The insurer design<;; the pro-
visions of the insuranc0 polic:· which ma:· he almost m1i11-
tellig-ihle to the insurecl. The insurer is a giant eorporn-
tion and the insured may he a totall:· nnedncatec1. enn 
illiterate, indiYidual. The 1wo,·isions for forfeiture an• 
often contained in the contract onl:·, there heing no statn-
tory protection for the insured, and may work a for-
feiture without notice or grace period. 
The doctrines of these cases apply. we helie\C', ,,·ith 
much greater force in the instant <:itnation "·1wre tl1P 
<' 11t i ty asst•1·t ing roverage is itself a corpora ti on of some 
l'ize, has a statutory ohligation to maintain coverage 
:rncl is protected against any possihilit)r that a forfeiture 
will occur without its knowlec1ge h>r a statutory pro-
,·ision that 30 days' notire of forfeiture must he giYen. 
'l'he po1i<7 is a standan1 rom1wnsation policy, (then' can 
lip no contention that it was treacherously designed by 
the rarrier) arnl the parties to the insurance contract 
are essentially equals. The significant differenre be-
tween the instant situation and the usual insurance sit-
uation is simply this: Here, the law (Section 46) im-
11nsrs on tlie insured an obligation to ins11rp nnrl kerr1 
i11s11rrrl and, inferentially, to he aware of the perform-
m1ce necessary to satisfy that ohligation and the conse-
<JlWnres of failure. The onus is not placed on insurance 
i'Ompanies b)r the legislature, it is placed on employers. 
Tlte issue we see in this case is one \d1ich freqnently 
nrises. Couch comments on the specific situation which 
r011fronts ns and cites numerous cases in support of his 
eonclusions. In quoting, we retain the footnote numbers 
from the original text to indicate the depth of the au-
thor's research. "\Ve do not, however, include the 
author's footnotes. At page 331 of Volume 6, Conch on 
Insurance 2nd, the following statement appears as a part 
of Section 32.111: 
"The ohligation to pn:· the premium when <hw 
is ordinarily nn indivisihle obligation to pay the 
entire premium, so that a forfeiture is not pre-
vented by part payment tlwreof :5 This means that 
a part payment will not keep the poli<7 in force 
for even such a proportionate part of the m•w 
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JH•riod as th<' snm hears to the \\-hole prrmiurn 
rhw. 6 
Tht> pnrtif's ma~- nf ronrse agT<'P tlrnt tlir in-
snrrr shn 11 accrpt thr p:cnt rrn~-m0nt as effectiw 
to kf'<'P the polic~· in forcr for th0 lWrio<l co\-Pl'Pd 
h~- the fnll ]We>minm which was (hW. 7 \Vherp rrnrt 
pa~-ment is ten<lerrd, the iw;nrer ma~· acrept snrli 
pa~·nwnt. resen·ing- tlw rig-ht to forf<:.it the poliry 
if th<> hala11r0 is 110t pai<l, partirnlarly where m;_ 
tice is g-in•n limiting- tl1e time of riayment of th(· 
balance.' '8 
The standard reference \\-orks take the same posi-
tion with reference to thr effect of a partial payment of 
premium. The Corpus .Juris statement ( 45 C.TS 195, In-
surance, Section 473 ( 5)) is as follows: 
"In the ahsrnce of an ag-reement to the contrary, 
a partial payment of a pr<>mium dne Rt a p::1rtir11-
lar time is of no effrct. So, where, under the trrms 
of a premium not<", thr compan~- is entitl<>d to rnl-
lert premiums as far as Parned, the acr0nb11r0 n+' 
R pa~·ment on the note which is less tlrnn tliP 
earne>d premium at the time the policy is forfeited 
will not keep the policy alive." 
The American .Jurisprudence comment is Section fi09 
of the Insurance treatise (29 Am . .Jur. 825). There is an 
annotation at 92 ALR 712. 
The general proposition that a part payment of pre-
mium, even if retained pending payment of the l1::1la11('1' 
before forfeiture date, does not reactivate a policy is \\'(•il 
entrenched in onr case. The U. S. Supreme Conrt 11:1, 
itself expressed this view in 87 ncum Y. N ('11' r nrk T, ifi 
lnsura.nre Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S. Ct. 523. In Yo111u1' 
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,l!ufual Trust Lifr Insurance Cornpany, :>4 N.D. GOO; ~10 
"'J..W. 177; 53 A.L.R. 910, the defendant compa11y rPtailll'd 
n di,-id<'rnl, which was less than the amount of a JH"Prninrn 
installment due, beyond the grace period. Dmi ng t 111• 
grace period, the insured had indicated his desire' tl1at 
the dividend he applied against the premium. Tlw c•om-
pa11~- therefore held money of the insured whieh eorndi-
tnted a part payment of the dividend hy their m11111al m1-
derstancling. N e\'ertheless, said the Court, fail11rp 1 o 
pa~· the balance "\\'ithin the garce period work<'cl a for-
feiture of the policy; there was no pro rat a oxfom1ion. 
In the fielrl of compensation i11suran<'e, the N<'w York 
Supreme Court ~-\ ppelJate DiYision very rN'PTJt ly (A pri I, 
] 0fi4) comiderecl a case where the carri<ff had r<'<'Pivc•d 
foll pa:-rnent of the current ~·ear'~ premium, hut the• i11-
-.;merl harl failerl to respond to a demand for a $48.GO prP-
minm ,_1pfir·ir:ncy for the previorn; year n~w~al<~d hy 11 y1~11 r-
enrl na:n-r,J1 a1Flit. Tn Taylr;r "· 1765 - 176.'1 Reofty OorJJ., 
~+~ ~~.Y. ~1J[Jf1. 2nr1 92Fi. it was h<~ld that a 1·arw<dl11f ion 
ha:'Pd r.·u fa:!'Jr1> tr1 fJay that pr<~viomi y<~ar'f.1 pn•mium dl'-
f!r·jr,u: -.:-3;; c.::c.r·t'.·.-·~· .\ ;;jmilar r<~sult, upholrlinl.(' 1·1111 
(·pllatir·l~ i:c •!:.i; :ar-r: r1f r'.hiim,~<1 fJart rmym,·n1 of fll'I'· 
mi um. --...-&' rc.ar:!:.i::<] jn r; rtc:r;yr,:-· \'. P'?rt~z /r{)n Wor/r.'i, I 7<i 
~ro. ::?2_1] :::r~. J-:;:J~. 19f;:i). ,y,. hav<~ found Tl" r·mwH 
11h.:.~·-:c >:_ • "12 !;h!IlF:!.~ rJf f1r,:miurn <~Xf,~rHJi.; II polj,•y 
•<F·.:.: • c-:_ .:.:'.".:. . ~-.'.; ~ ~1r/ ~ r7 ~ f.i':r:i f ir·:tJI y prr1 V jrJ <•H f' IJr j f. (II H j f 
.Jr,.:.~ ,-" ':..•.:. rJ:'."' -.:.[.r:-r<: •he: <:l<:Tfl':TJf.ri. ,,f '~~f11p111·l 111'1' 
'• 
POINT III 
THE ~Ll<~?\fENTR OF ERTOPPEL ARE NOT 
PREREN"T HERE. 
ThP onl~T comlnet of the Plaintiff in thiR caRe to 
which A-1 haR pointed as an indication of Plaintiff':-;: 
willingness to waive any right to fnl1 payment aml to ex-
tend credit for unpaid preminm ha1ancr is the tranRmit-
tal of the December 30th statement. A-1 contendR that 
Romehow, h~T giving a final written reminder that addi-
tional prrminm was due, Plaintiff ·waiv0d its right to 
terminate coverage on .T anuary 14, the end of the grar-C> 
period, if th<> premium balance was not so01wr forth-
coming. The m0re sending of a Rtatement during thr 
gr::.c0 p0riod can hardly he intNpreted as a waiver or 
promisC' to Pxtrnd credit. In Rllerbrck v. Conth1r11fo1 
Ca.c;11alt11 Cnmpa1111. 63 U. 530; 227 Pac. 805, this Conrt 
had orrn.c.;ion to comment on the argument that the send-
ing of sh\ tern en ts constituted a representation that cr0dit 
was being extended. The Court disposed of tlw argnme11i 
with this language: 
"It cannot he reaRonahly contrnc1e(1 tlint t1w men' 
sending of RtatementR 011 thP first of Parh mo11th 
for 2 months nft0r the payment waR dne was Rnch 
n rerognition of thr PxiRtenre of t1w insnr:rnc<' 
m1(1 waiYer of payment that the i101icy remainr(1 
in force an i11(1efinite time aftC>r thr date of Rrrn1-
irn~ the 1n::;t ;:;tat0mrnt." 
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POINT IV 
THE COl\n\fISSTON ERRED IN FAILING TO 
MAKE FINDINGS OR ADOPT CONCLU-
SIONS FROl\f WHICH ITS THEORY OF LIA-
BILITY COULD BE DETER!\H"t\ED. 
The Commission made a finding in this case that A-1 
was "covered with workmen's rompensation insurance" 
h~r Plaintiff on January 19, 1966. It made no findings or 
ronrlusions vvith reference to the receipt of the cancella-
tion notire, the effect of part payment of premium or 
as to any Plaintiff eonduct which could be interpreted as 
estoppel. Since Plaintiff cannot determine, from the 
findings and conclusions, what the Commission's theory 
of liability is, Plaintiff is at a severe disadvantage in at-
tempting to present fully the authorities on the issue the 
Commission may have found determinative. 
Plaintiff has assumed, for this review, that the 
Commission roncluded a part payment of premium ex-
t011ds a rompensation policy for a pro rata portion of the 
policy year. The law does not, however, contemplate that 
the parties must speculate about the theory of liability. 
The statutory requirement that findings and conclusions 
he stated has no significance if the Commission fails to 
<lisclose what it considers to he the disposifr\'e issues. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff clearly filed its cancellation notice at a tinw 
when A-1 was two months delinquent in premium pa~-­
ment. Plaintiff had statutory right to cancrl anc1 ('X('r-
cised that right in a manner consistrnt with tllC' imnuancr 
policy and the law before the accident occUlT('d whieh is 
the basis of this claim. If the Commission has jurisc1i<'-
tion to order an immrance carrier, and not just the em-
ployer, to pay compensation, it has found carrier liabil-
ity in this case against the lav;r and in abuse of its ad-
ministrative authority. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRArrT 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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